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ATTORNEY'S FEES
Winners, Losers, and Attorney's Fees: Who Pays and When?
by Jay E. Grenig
John C. Fogerty
V.
Fantasy, Inc.
(Docket No. 92-1750)
Argument Date: December 8, 1993
From: The Ninth Circuit
ISSUE
May a prevailing defendant in a copyright-infringement
action recover attorney's fees under Section 505 of the 1976
Copyright Act without showing that
the plaintiff's action was frivolous
or brought in bad faith? Case at
FACTS raditionally
In 1970 John Fogerty, songwriter, American
musician and former lead singer with T legal costs
the musical group Creedence win or lose. Hox
Clearwater Revival, wrote a song cases, the losing pa
entitled "Run Through the Jungle." pay the winning p
He sold the exclusive publishing and, under the Fe
rights to the song to the predecessor reasonable attome)
of Fantasy, Inc. in exchange for a ed to the winne
sales percentage and other royalties Supreme Court
derived from the song's exploitation, whether a losing
Fifteen years later Fogerty pub- infringement suit
lished a song entitled "The Old Man lous or brought in 1
Down the Road." He registered a can order the plai
copyright and authorized Warner ney's fees of the w
Brothers Records, Inc. to distribute it.
Alleging that "The Old Man
Down the Road" was merely "Run Through the Jungle" with
new words, Fantasy filed an action for copyright infringe-
ment against Fogerty, Warner, and related companies in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of
California. Fogerty counterclaimed, seeking rescission of the
music-publishing agreements he had entered into with
Fantasy's predecessors and a financial accounting.
One expert witness testified that the two songs had many
notes in common. Another expert testified that the two songs
Jay E. Grenig is professor of law at Marquette University Law
School, 1103 West Wisconsin Avenue, Milwaukee, WI 53233;
(414) 288-5377.
were "substantially similar" and "such differences as may exist
between the two melodies are insubstantial and indeed insignif-
icant." At trial, Fogerty played his guitar and sang for the jury
65 times. The jury returned a verdict for Fogerty.
The trial court denied Fogerty's motion for more than
$1,000,000 in attorney's fees. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the
infringement action was not frivolous or brought in bad faith so
as to warrant an award of attorney's fees. Fantasy, Inc. v.
Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524 (9th Cir. 1993). The court explained
that, in the Ninth Circuit, a prevailing defendant in litigation
brought under the 1976 Copyright Act may not be awarded
attorney's fees under Section 505 unless the defendant proves
that the action was frivolous or was
instituted and prosecuted in bad faith.
Glance The Supreme Court granted Fogerty's
petition for certiorari to review this
arties to a lawsuit in decision.
urts pay their own
id attorney's fees, BACKGROUND AND
'er, in exceptional SIGNIFICANCE
may be required to Under the so-called "American
's attorney's fees, Rule," parties to a lawsuit generally
ral Copyright Act, pay their own attorney's fees
fees may be award- although, in exceptional cases, attor-
In this case, the ney's fees may be awarded to the pre-
asked to decide vailing party. Fees may also be recov-
intiff's copyright- ered by the prevailing party if
st have been frivo- recovery is authorized by statute or by
faith before a court agreement of the parties. Under the
ff to pay the attor- "British Rule," attorney's fees are
ing defendant, generally awarded to the prevailing
party. The concept underlying the
British Rule is that, unless there is an
award of attorney's fees to the winner of a lawsuit, the winner
has not been made whole. The American Rule is premised on
the policy that plaintiffs would be reluctant to vindicate their
rights if, upon losing, they are required to pay the attorney's
fees of the party they sued.
The attorney's fees provision of the 1976 Copyright Act,
which was reenacted by Congress in substantially the same
form as it appeared in the 1909 Copyright Act, gives a trial
court discretion to award attorney's fees to the prevailing party
in a copyright-infringement action. However, the federal courts
of appeals have issued conflicting opinions on the standard to
be applied in determining whether or not a prevailing defendant
is entitled to attorney's fees.
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The District of Columbia, Second, and Seventh Circuits
apply the Ninth Circuit's frivolous or bad-faith standard. Video
Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd., 925 F.2d 1010 (7th Cir. 1991);
Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc. v. Conservative Digest, Inc., 821
F.2d 800 (D.C.Cir. 1987); Roth v. Pritikin, 787 F.2d 54 (2d Cir.
1986). The Third and Eleventh Circuits do not require proof of
frivolity or bad faith as a prerequisite for awarding attorney's
fees. Lieb v. Topstone Indus., Inc., 788 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1986);
Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. McCall Pattern Co.,
825 F.2d 355 (11 th Cir. 1987).
Fogerty and Fantasy differ as to how the policies underlying
the Copyright Act will be enhanced by the Supreme Court's
decision in this matter. Fogerty suggests that an evenhanded
attitude in awarding attorney's fees is particularly important as
the business world develops "works" in such new areas of tech-
nology as electronics, computers, and biotechnology.
He focuses on the existence of competing interests, arguing
that it is necessary to balance the claims of the public for wide-
spread distribution of these works against the claims of authors
and the media for trade monopolies. According to Fogerty, there
is no reason why defendants who are the prevailing authors or
owners of infringed works should be denied attorney's fees sim-
ply because they are labeled "defendants," while plaintiffs who
are the prevailing authors and owners should be allowed to
recover fees merely because they are labeled "plaintiffs."
It is Fogerty's position that anything other than an evenhand-
ed approach in copyright-infringement cases results in a tactical
windfall to plaintiffs. Fogerty points out that Fantasy refused to
pay over $1.4 million in royalties admittedly owed to him until
resolution of the copyright action, while causing him to incur
over $1 million in fees and costs defending the action. While
Fogerty had the means to withstand the economic burden, many
other authors, whose interests are meant to be protected and pre-
served by the Copyright Act, are not so well situated.
Fantasy responds that upholding the Ninth Circuit's con-
struction of Section 505 will encourage copyright enforcement.
According to Fantasy, to assess attorney's fees against copy-
right plaintiffs simply because they do not prevail would sub-
stantially add to the risks inherent in most litigation and would
undercut the efforts of Congress to promote the vigorous
enforcement of the copyright laws. Fantasy asserts that the
Ninth Circuit's construction of Section 505 enhances the pre-
dictability of copyright ownership by providing a reasonably
certain benchmark for the award of attorney's fees in copyright-
enforcement actions.
In deciding this case, the Suprme Court may be guided by its
attorney's fees decisions in other areas. For example, in a civil
rights case involving an attorney's fees statute containing lan-
guage identical to that found in Section 505, the Court held that
"a district court may in its discretion award attorney's fees to a
prevailing defendant" only "upon a finding that the plaintiff's
action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
Fogerty suggests that the justification for the Christiansburg
standard does not apply to actions under the Copyright Act
because the Act was not enacted to provide a mechanism for
enforcing and vindicating individual rights. Fogerty points out
that, rather than seeking to punish violations of federal law,
copyright actions generally serve the purpose of clarifying the
scope of the limited monopoly created by the Copyright Act.
Fantasy, disagrees, contending that the American legal system
does not regard bringing a losing case, without more, as the
infliction of a legal wrong, particularly where a plaintiff's
defeat on the merits of an otherwise reasonable claim may
result from the highly complex nature of the evidence.
ARGUMENTS
For John C. Fogerty (Counsel of Record: Kenneth I. Sidle;
Gipson Hoffman & Pancione, 1901 Avenue of the Stars, Suite
1100, Los Angeles, CA 90067; telephone (310) 556-4660):
1. Courts should not make it more difficult for prevailing defen-
dants to obtain an award of attorney's fees than for prevail-
ing plaintiffs.
2. Congress did not intend to adopt a dual standard for the
award of attorney's fees when it enacted Section 505 of the
Copyright Act.
3. The justifications for a dual standard do not apply to copy-
right actions that involve competing copyright claims.
For Fantasy, Inc. (Counsel of Record: Lawrence S. Robbins;
Mayer, Brown & Platt, 2000 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW,
Washington, DC 20006; telephone (202) 778-0611):
1. A prevailing defendant is entitled to attorney's fees under
Section 505 of the Copyright Act only if the defendant
shows that the plaintiff's lawsuit was frivolous or otherwise
objectively unreasonable.
2. The dual standard in awarding attorneys fees encourages
effective copyright enforcement and promotes predictability
and certainty in copyright ownership.
3. By reenacting without change the attorney's fee provision of
the 1909 Copyright Act, Congress ratified the well-settled
judicial construction of the earlier provision, which is the
standard applied by the Ninth Circuit in this case.
AMICUS BRIEFS
In Support of John C. Fogerty
Hewlett-Packard Co. (Counsel of Record: Jonathan A.
Marshall; Pennie & Edmonds, 1155 Avenue of the Americas,
New York, NY 10036-2 711; telephone (212) 790-9090).
In Support of Fantasy, Inc.
Apple Computer, Inc. (Counsel of Record: Jack E. Brown;
Brown & Bain, 2901 North Central Avenue, P.O. Box 400,
Phoenix, AZ 85001-0400; telephone (602) 351-8000).
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